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6Introduction
More than a decade after the United Nations (UN) Security Council expressed its concern about the illegal 
exploitation of natural resources in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), international organizations, 
governments and industry bodies have in recent years increased emphasis on the accountability of 
companies sourcing minerals from eastern DRC and the wider region. The impetus which brought on a 
variety of initiatives aimed at enhancing transparency and corporate accountability with regard to the 
mineral trade both in and from eastern DRC, was related to legislative initiatives in the United States (US) 
which focused on con!ict minerals. The legislative process in the US started in 2008 and resulted in a 
provision on con!ict minerals from the DRC and adjoining countries in a larger law that became known 
as the Dodd/Frank Act. The Act is targeted towards Wall Street reform in response to the "nancial crisis 
and was signed into law by US President Obama in July 2010.
The provision on con!ict minerals is contained in Section 1502 of the Act and imposes legal obligations 
with regard to due diligence measures by companies that trade on US Exchanges and are implicated in 
the supply-chains of tin, tantalum, tungsten and gold, the four main metals extracted from eastern DRC 
ores. The US law created a great sense of urgency in international diplomatic circles and in the business 
community. The pressure to create con!ict-free supply-chains of the minerals concerned mounted 
further when the UN Group of Experts released its latest report in November 2010, which illustrated in 
detail how in the DRC both rebels and the national army are pro"ting from the mineral trade. Political 
momentum subsequently increased when the UN Security Council strongly expressed its support for 
the Group of Expert’s due diligence guidelines.
In the DRC President Kabila imposed an embargo on all exploitation and exports from the Kivu provinces 
and Maniema (September 2010 until March 2011), causing among other things the implementation 
of several certi"cation and traceability schemes to be put on hold. Meanwhile, the International 
Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) has, in December 2010, endorsed the Guidance of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), which provides industry with a set 
of well conceptualized due diligence measures. Finally, at the European Union (EU) level legislators are 
currently considering the adoption of legislation on con!ict minerals from eastern DRC in the vein of the 
pertaining provisions in the Dodd/Frank Act.
This brie"ng paper o#ers a short description of the ongoing initiatives by legislators, governments, 
multilateral organizations and industry aiming to ensure that mineral supply-chains are not tainted by 
con!ict in eastern DRC. The paper brie!y describes their genesis, the current state of a#airs, the linkages 
between the initiatives and the main challenges they face. Links to key documents are incorporated in 
the footnotes, which should enable the reader to become further acquainted with the subject.
This paper is based on a literature review and interviews conducted by researchers of the International 
Peace Information Service (IPIS).
7I. Initiatives by international organizations 
and governments
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD)
Following the L’Aquila G8 Summit in 2009, the OECD1 hosted a working group which aimed at 
establishing guidelines for companies operating in or sourcing minerals from con!ict-a#ected areas. 
In December 2010, this e#ort resulted in the "nal draft of a Guidance2 which, through a comprehensive 
process of consultations, was drawn from the input of high-level governmental, industry and civil society 
stakeholders (see below). The UN Group of Experts (UNGoE) on the DRC was key in conceiving the OECD 
guidelines. Consequently, the Group’s recommendations for appropriate due diligence measures3 in its 
latest report (Nov. 2010 – see below) are mirrored in the OECD Guidance4.
It is important to note that the OECD Guidance as such does not entail legal obligations for actors in 
the supply-chain. Cases of violation by companies can be brought to the OECD National Contact Points 
(NCPs) of their country of domicile, but the ensuing procedure has no judicial value. The NCPs, whose 
criteria of composition vary between member states, rather play a “mediating role” between con!icting 
parties (read: civil society groups vs. companies). Proceedings result in a communiqué or statement of 
the NCP which, again, is legally non-binding and does not result in punitive measures.5
This said, the OECD Guidance has the merit to provide actors in the supply-chain with a detailed and well 
de"ned set of guidelines, which through an inclusive consultation process has gained support from key 
stakeholders.6 These stakeholders include initiators7 of other due diligence, traceability or certi"cation 
endeavours, both governmental (i.e. International Conference of the Great Lakes Region/Regional 
Certi"cation Mechanism8, Bundesanstalt für Geowissenschaften und Rohsto#e/Certi"ed Trading 
1 The lead was taken by the OECD Investment Committee and the OECD Development Assistance Committee. An overview of 
the project can be found at; http://www.oecd.org/document/36/0,3746,en_2649_33765_44307940_1_1_1_1,00.html (last 
accessed on 22/02/2011). 
2 The link to this "nal version can be found at: http://www.oecd.org/document/36/0,3746,en_2649_34889_44307940_1_1_1_
1,00&&en-USS_01DBC.html (last accessed on 21/02/2011). 
3 The OECD furnishes the following de"nition of due diligence: “Due diligence is an on-going, proactive and reactive process 
through which companies can ensure that they respect human rights and do not contribute to con!ict. Due diligence can also 
help companies ensure they observe international law and comply with domestic laws, including those governing the illicit 
trade in minerals and United Nations sanctions. Risk-based due diligence refers to the steps companies should take to identify 
and address actual or potential risks in order to prevent or mitigate adverse impacts associated with their activities or sourcing 
decisions.”
4 The UN GoE outlines the same "ve-step due diligence approach as the OECD Guidance and refers to the Guidance for further 
details (S/2010/596 p. 86).
5 The DRC Panel’s report of 2002, which named and shamed numerous companies and individuals involved in the plundering 
of natural resources in the DRC, brought the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises to the fore by denouncing 
companies to be in breach with these Guidelines. Subsequently, several advocacy groups resorted to the OECD Guidelines 
and accompanying procedures as an instrument to hold companies accountable. Cases were, for instance, brought before 
the NCP’s of the UK and Belgium. In one of these cases, UK company Afrimex was found to have been in breach with the 
Guidelines. While this had no consequence in law, it did contribute to the understanding that companies sourcing from 
eastern DRC should take due diligence seriously.
6 The list of participants in the third consultation (Nairobi, Dec. 2010) illustrates the wide array of stakeholders consulted. The 
link to the list can be found at: http://www.oecd.org/document/41/0,3746,en_2649_34889_45793897_1_1_1_1,00.html 
(last accessed on 21/02/2011).
7 The initiatives listed here will be discussed further in this paper.
8 The Guidance has been endorsed by the ICGLR in the Lusaka Declaration (Dec. 2010). See: www.oecd.org/
dataoecd/33/18/47143500.pdf  (last accessed on 08/02/2011).
8Chains9) and industry based (i.e. International Tin Research Institute/Tin Supply-chain Initiative10, Global 
E-Sustainability Initiative/ Electronics Industry Citizenship Coalition11). 
In short, the OECD has succeeded in creating the point of reference for due diligence of the supply-
chain of minerals from eastern DRC (EDRC), while securing ample buy-in from international actors in the 
supply-chain and from relevant political bodies, both regional and international. Companies sourcing 
minerals from the DRC (or other con!ict-a#ected areas) who adopt the Guidance, pledge not to pro"t 
from or contribute by any means to torture and degrading treatment, compulsory labor, the worst forms 
of child labor, other gross human rights violations or war crimes.12 Further, they will not tolerate direct 
or indirect support to non-state armed groups through the entire supply-chain, or to public and private 
security forces who illegally control mines or levy illegal taxes at any point in the supply-chain.
The Guidance further provides details on risk mitigation in the supply-chain of tin, tantalum and tungsten 
(commonly referred to as “the three T’s”) and rigorous, comprehensive due diligence measures to be 
taken by upstream (mines to smelters/re"ners) and downstream (smelters/re"ners to retailers) actors. 
Local minerals exporters are, for instance, required to gather and disclose information on all taxes and 
other payments made along the supply-chain to government, security forces and armed groups; on 
the ownership and corporate structure of the exporter; on the mine of mineral origin; on the identity 
of all intermediaries; on the locations where minerals are traded and processed; and on transportation 
routes. The Guidance further recommends that this information is regularly checked on the ground by 
an assessment team, who are tasked to provide recommendations for risk mitigation.
The OECD is aware of the challenge this poses to actors in the upstream supply-chain and therefore calls 
upon donors to support e#orts to strengthen supply-chain monitoring capacity in the DRC and improve 
wider governance systems, stretching beyond the mineral sector (customs, tax collection, the judiciary 
system and the security sector).13 To disseminate information and receive feedback on the Guidance 
locally, the OECD held a workshop with local actors in the supply-chain (“comptoirs”, miners’ associations, 
civil society,...) in Goma, the capital of North Kivu, in mid-March 2011. At the event, North Kivu comptoirs 
formally endorsed the Guidance. The OECD will remain engaged in e#orts to further disseminate the 
Guidance in and outside the region and to assist upstream and downstream stakeholders in putting it 
into practice, including day-to-day implementation and assessment. Finally, the OECD is working on a 
supplementary guideline for gold, where risk mitigation strategies in this very complex supply-chain 
can be better detailed.
UN Group of Experts on the DRC (UNGoE)
In 2003 the UN Security Council (UNSC) imposed an arms embargo and sanctions regime that has been 
modi"ed and strengthened over time.14 Subsequently, a UN Group of Experts (UNGoE) was created to 
assist the Sanctions Committee and to monitor the implementation of the sanctions regime.15 The Group 
replaced a Panel of Experts, installed in 2000 to investigate the illegal exploitation of natural resources 
in the DRC.
9  The BGR/CTC project has adopted standards derived from the OECD Guidance. See: http://www.bgr.bund.de/nn_1756078/
EN/Themen/Min__rohsto#e/CTC/Approach/Standards-Principles/standards-principles__node__en.html?__nnn=true (last 
accessed on 15/02/2011). 
10 The iTSCI repeatedly expresses its adherence to the OECD Guidance. See for example: www.itri.co.uk/SITE/.../8_iTSCi_News_
Bulletin_October_2010_EN.pdf (last accessed on 23/02/2011).
11 GESI/EICC equally considers support for the OECD Guidance as a priority. See: http://www.gesi.org/Media/
PressReleaseFullstory/tabid/104/smid/503/ArticleID/69/reftab/61/Default.aspx (last accessed on 10/02/2011).
12 This paragraph and the next is based on the Guidance document. See: http://www.oecd.org/document/36/0,3746,en_264
9_34889_44307940_1_1_1_1,00&&en-USS_01DBC.html (last accessed on 21/02/2011). 
13 http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/17/27/46785670.htm (last accessed on 22/02/2011).
14 Under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Security Council can take enforcement measures to maintain or restore international 
peace and security.
15  http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1533/ (last accessed on 15/01/2011).
9The UN GoE’s latest report highlights numerous cases that illustrate the role of minerals in perpetuating 
and exacerbating the con!ict in EDRC. This adds to the long list of similar evidence in previous reports, 
which thus builds a strong case for due diligence measures on behalf of all actors involved in the supply 
of minerals from EDRC. On request of the UNSC16, the UNGoE has, in its latest report, included a chapter 
which provides extensive guidance on the issue of due diligence.17  
Based on the instructions from the UNSC, it pertained to the UN GoE mandate to “provide guidance to 
importers, processors and consumers of minerals from the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo on how to mitigate the risk of providing direct or indirect support to illegal armed groups 
and/or to individuals and entities that are subject to targeted UN sanctions”.18 On the ground, however, 
it is clear that also elements of the regular army (Forces Armées de la RDC or FARDC), often perpetrators 
of serious human rights abuses, are involved in the illegal exploitation, taxation and trade of minerals 
in EDRC. Consequently, the UNGoE’s latest report suggests the option to equally take into account the 
illegal involvement of FARDC elements in the mining sector in due diligence measures by industry. 
Crucially, the UNSC accepted this option thereby, innovatively, including reference to perpetrators of 
human rights abuses by the regular army in the notion of due diligence.19 By entering this provision 
in the Resolution, the UNSC avoids a major pitfall that continues to undermine the credibility of the 
Kimberley Process Certi"cation Scheme (KPCS), to date the most high-pro"le system aimed at stemming 
the !ow of con!ict minerals to legal markets. The KPCS narrowly de"nes ‘con!ict diamonds’ as diamonds 
that ‘"nance rebel movements’. It is therefore inapt to take appropriate measures when state actors 
commit gross human rights violations against their own population, as was recently the case in the 
Marange diamond "elds of Zimbabwe20. As we will point out below, the designers of the ICGLR tracking 
system, who have a thorough working knowledge of the KPCS, carefully avoided the many !aws of the 
diamond certi"cation scheme. 
Although the due diligence procedures outlined by the UNGoE and the OECD are more or less identical, 
there is a crucial distinction as to their potential impact. While the OECD Guidance is voluntary, UNSC 
Resolution 1952 obliges the UN Sanctions Committee to take into account whether or not an individual 
or entity has exercised due diligence, when considering whether or not to sanction them or it. Whether 
this is going to make a di#erence in practice, will depend upon the willingness of UN member states to 
put their nationals or companies forward for sanctions21 and on the level of implementation of sanctions 
by countries trading with the DRC22.
Resolution 1952 extends the mandate of the UNGoE until November 2011 and asks for an addition of a 
natural resource expert to the Group. The UN GoE is tasked to evaluate the impact of its due diligence 
guidelines and to continue its collaboration with other forums on the issue. They will therefore remain 
the most authoritative source of on-the-ground information. The Group’s next reports are due 18 May 
and 17 October 2011.
16 In paragraph 7 of Resolution 1896 (2009)  the UNSC requested recommendations for the exercise of due diligence by 
importers.
17 Chapter IX S/2010/596 p. 83.
18 Resolution 1896 referring to Resolution 1857, paragraph 4 (g).
19 S/Res/1952 (2010) paragraph 7.
20 Information on the Zimbabwe case can be found on the websites of Partnership Africa Canada and Global Witness. Since 
its inception in 2003, the KPCS has been hampered by its decision-making system, which is based on full consensus of 
all member countries. The power of veto, indiscriminately granted to all KPCS members, has created a situation whereby 
any reference to human rights is systematically excluded from the KPCS’ administrative decisions, communiqués and core 
documents. See, for instance: Other Facets, PAC, February 2011. http://www.pacweb.org/index-e.php (last accessed on 
23/02/2011).
21 In July 2010, Global Witness "led a law suit against the UK government for failing to list UK companies involved in the DRC 
mineral trade for sanctions: see http://www.globalwitness.org/library/global-witness-takes-uk-government-court-failing-
list-uk-companies-trading-congo-con!ict (last accessed on 23/02/2011).
22 This level is reportedly low as far as the DRC’s regional and Asian trading partners are concerned. See: Good Deal, Bad Deal. 
Report of the Conference ‘Illegal Trade in Natural Resources – What can Brussels Do?’, Institute for Environmental Security, 
November 2010, p. 17.
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Legislative measures against con!ict minerals
The United States
In July 2010 the US Senate passed the Dodd/Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act23, 
which mainly concerns "nancial reform in the US. The Act, however, also contains a provision regarding 
Congolese ‘con!ict minerals’ (Section 1502), the result of several years of intense lobbying by, among 
others, advocacy groups and faith-based investors. The provision merged two pre-existing Congressional 
bills on con!ict minerals and was introduced in the Act by Senator Sam Brownback.
Under the Act, any company that o#ers its securities for sale to the general public in the US24 - and is 
thus required to register with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)25- and whose products 
contain coltan (columbite-tantalite), cassiterite, gold or wolframite, all categorically de"ned as “con!ict 
minerals” - will have to disclose on a yearly basis whether these minerals originate from the DRC or an 
adjoining country26. 
Claims that the con!ict minerals used do not originate from the DRC or its neighbors, will have to be 
substantiated by a description in its annual report of how the company reached this conclusion. In case 
the con!ict minerals used do originate in the DRC or its neighboring countries, or if the company is 
uncertain of the minerals’ origin, it has to include a “Con!ict Minerals Report” (CMR) in its annual report 
to the SEC. The CMR has to contain “a description of the measures taken by the person to exercise due 
diligence on the source and chain of custody of such minerals [...] and a description of the products 
manufactured or contracted to be manufactured that are not DRC con!ict free (‘DRC con!ict free’ is 
de"ned to mean the products that do not contain minerals that directly or indirectly "nance or bene"t 
armed groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo or an adjoining country) [...], the facilities used to 
process the con!ict minerals, the country of origin of the con!ict minerals, and the e#orts to determine 
the mine or location of origin with the greatest possible speci"city.”27 The companies’ supply-chain due 
diligence e#orts have to be subjected to a private sector audit.
The Act obliges companies to furnish this audit and the “Con!ict Minerals Report” to the SEC and 
to publish both documents on their website. By subjecting this information to public scrutiny, the 
reputational risk towards consumers for companies using con!ict minerals will increase. In the words of 
Toby Whitney, legislative director for Congressman Jim McDermott: “It’s a name-and-shame bill. There 
will only be "nes for companies that do not do good reporting and auditing. Companies that carry out all 
the correct due diligence and report back to the SEC that they are indeed importing con!ict minerals will 
not be "ned.”28/29 Nevertheless, the Act requires the State Department to, jointly with the US Agency for 
International Development (USAID), develop a strategy on how to break the linkages between minerals 
and con!ict in the DRC, including the drafting of punitive measures against commercial entities that 
support human rights violations.30 This adds to UN sanctions which already apply to individuals and 
entities supporting illegal armed groups in EDRC through illicit trade of natural resources.31 
23 http://www.sec.gov/about/laws/wallstreetreform-cpa.pdf (last accessed on 15/02/2011). 
24 Importantly, this means that not only US based companies will be required to report, but also foreign companies that are 
trading on any of the stock exchanges in the US.
25 The mission of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission is to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and e$cient 
markets, and facilitate capital formation.
26 The new law enters into force on the 1 April 2011. Nevertheless, companies only have to submit their "rst report at the end 
of the "scal year that starts after the law enters into force. A company whose "scal year starts in March 2011 for example, 
will have to report for the "rst time in March 2013.
27 See: http://www.sec.gov/about/laws/wallstreetreform-cpa.pdf (last accessed on 15/02/2011).
28 Cited by Congo researcher Jason Stearns: http://enterpriseresilienceblog.typepad.com/enterprise_resilience_man/2010/12/
con!ict-minerals-and-the-supply-chain.html (last accessed on 24/02/2011).
29 It is important to note that the bill does not set forth penalties for non-compliance with reporting requirements. See: 
www.akingump.com/.../110111_SEC’s_Proposed_“Con!ict_Minerals”_Rules_A#ect_Multiple_Industries_and_Requir.pdf 
(last accessed on 28/02/2011). On the other hand, as noted above, non-compliance with due diligence recommendations 
outlined in the latest UNGoE report is a criterion for the application of UN sanctions under Resolution 1952.
30  http://www.sec.gov/about/laws/wallstreetreform-cpa.pdf Section 1502 (c) (last accessed on 15/02/2011).
31 UN Security Council Resolution 1857 (2008).
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To date, the strategic plan of the State Department and USAID has not been put forward. However, 
without referring to it, the US Ambassador to the DRC on 27 January 2011 announced the allocation of 
USD 11 million for programs contributing to the regulation of the mineral trade in EDRC.32 The underlying 
ambition seems rather grand as this fund should, among other things, contribute to improving road 
infrastructure (mines to trading centers), capacity building of police and other government entities, and 
capacity building of local communities to monitor all activities related to minerals, including traceability 
initiatives.
Many concepts and de"nitions in Section 1502 of the Dodd/Frank Act require further speci"cation, a 
task conferred upon the SEC which should develop concrete rules as a guidance to the law. Therefore, 
the SEC launched a consultation process in which any stakeholder could send recommendations.33 This 
was initially announced to close on 31 January 2011, but it was extended until 2 March 2011, whereas 
the rules should become e#ective on 15 April 2011. As “con!ict minerals” are used in a very wide range of 
products, the law concerns, besides actors across the entire supply-chain (miners, traders, processors,...), 
a great number of manufacturers from, among others, the medical, automotive, aerospace, electronics 
and jewelry industries. 
This is re!ected in the response to the SEC’s call for recommendations by a wide array of companies 
and industry groups.34 Corporate concerns are mainly about compliance costs, timing, creating a level 
playing "eld, competitive disadvantages, and arrangements for existing stocks and recycled metals. 
With the adoption date of the rules nearing, the US Chamber of Commerce has threatened the SEC 
with legal action over the alleged lack of a proper cost-bene"t analysis.35 Finally, arguments against a 
rigorous application of the Act culminate in the prediction that this would lead to a de facto embargo 
of minerals from EDRC, with catastrophic consequences to the region’s economy and increased tensions 
as a result.36 In this context, it is important to note that Section 1502 requires the director of the US 
Government Accountability O$ce (GAO) to, starting in July 2012, annually evaluate the e#ectiveness of 
the Law in promoting peace in the region.
Civil society input includes recommendations by the United Kingdom (UK) based NGO Global Witness, 
which has advised the SEC to take over the "ve point framework for due diligence of the UNGoE and the 
OECD, as the Act does not set forth a speci"c standard.37 Global Witness further puts into perspective 
corporate concerns about the challenges and complexities related to proper supply-chain due diligence. 
In addition, the US advocacy group Enough has suggested detailed speci"cations on due diligence 
requirements and proposes a number of de"nitions of key concepts in the Act.38 
In a rare submission by EDRC stakeholders, three heads of EDRC mining cooperatives, claiming support 
by high-level o$cials in North Kivu, complain that the local population has not been consulted on the 
US legislation and state that they are putting in place a traceability scheme in cooperation with the 
International Tin Research Institute (ITRI).39
A politically important submission comes from the ICGLR, which stresses among other things that its 
tracking system currently permits to follow the supply-chain to the points of export in DRC (comptoirs) 
and that it will soon be possible to trace minerals further upstream to the level of the individual mines.40 
32  http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201101280554.html (last accessed on 02/03/2011).
33  www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2010/34-63547.pdf (last accessed on 02/03/2011).
34 All comments submitted can be viewed at: http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-40-10/s74010.shtml (last accessed on 
24/02/2011).
35 http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/07/us-"nancial-regulation-sec-chamber-idUSTRE7265B220110307 (last accessed 
on 28/03/2011) The SEC has estimated the number of companies obliged to furnish a “Con!ict Minerals Report” to be 
around 1,200. See: www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2010/34-63547.pdf   p. 72 (last accessed on 28/03/2011).
36 See, for instance, the submission by the International Tin Research Institute: http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-40-10/
s74010-61.pdf (last accessed on 01/03/2011).
37 http://www.globalwitness.org/sites/default/"les/library/Global%20Witness%20Submission%20to%20the%20SEC%20-%20
12%20October%202010.pdf (last accessed on 28/02/2011).
38  http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-40-10/s74010-65.pdf (last accessed on 01/03/2011).
39 The ITRI will be further explained in a later section.  www.sec.gov/comments/s7-40-10/s74010-179.pdf (last accessed on 
28/03/2011).
40  http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-40-10/s74010-54.pdf (last accessed on 01/03/2011).
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However, given the current implementation status of the ICGLR’s Regional Initiative on Natural Resources, 
it is clear that the ICGLR tracking system will not be up and running on the planned adoption date of 
the SEC’s rules (see below). Elsewhere, the Rwandan government, a ICGLR member, issued a request in 
the press for a delay until the end of 2012 before Section 1502 would become e#ective.41 Finally, the 
Tanzanian42 Chamber of Minerals and Energy voiced its concern that the gold sector of the country, 
which is of considerable importance, would unduly be a#ected by Section 1502.43
Box 1: Conflict Minerals Map
A crucial provision in Section 1502 of the Dodd/Frank Act is that the US State Department 
should draw a ‘Con!ict Minerals Map’ within six months after enactment. This map has to 
be made available to the public and should be renewed every six months. The map should 
depict mines located in areas under the control of armed groups in DRC as Con!ict Zone 
Mines, thus providing companies conducting supply-chain due diligence with essential on-
the-ground information. 
Although many stakeholders have been advocating for the production of such a map, for 
example the UNGoE in their December 2008 report, a reliable version is currently still not 
available. It should also be noted that, given the volatile situation on the ground, such a map 
should be updated regularly.
New geographic data on mining and human rights violations stems from two sources. The "rst 
source is the Belgian research NGO IPIS and their local partners who collected data in the "rst 
half of 2009 (in the Kivu provinces) and in the "rst half of 2010 (in North Katanga, Maniema 
and South-East Orientale). These data were published in several maps that are available on the 
IPIS website.44 Apart from the IPIS data, the DRC peacekeeping mission MONUSCO has tried 
to keep track of the positions of armed groups in relation to mining sites. A MONUSCO sta# 
member has the task of "ltering this information from general MONUSCO reports after which 
it is geo-referenced. Production of such maps by MONUSCO are troubled because the UN 
mission lacks the necessary manpower to process all the data in time and exercises restraint 
in sharing its data for reasons of con"dentiality. As well, the mining site positions MONUSCO 
uses are mostly taken from the IPIS data.45 
The IPIS and MONUSCO data were used as the principal sources of two other “mineral 
maps” that have been published since 2009. The DRC has produced two maps of its own 
through SAESSCAM, a state institution for the formalization of artisanal mining, and with the 
assistance of the German Bundesanstalt für Geowissenschaften. The latest was published in 
February 2010. It is not clear whether SAESSCAM will continue to produce similar maps as 
the responsibility for mapping within the Congolese mining ministry has been given to CaMi 
(Cadastre Minier).46 
The US Department of State has, since the enactment of the Dodd/Frank Act, not produced 
an updated map. Its latest “minerals map” is dated from June 2010 and was based on existing 
data, mainly gathered from the IPIS maps.47/48 
41  http://allafrica.com/stories/201102220169.html (last accessed on 28/03/2011).
42 Also Tanzania is a ICGLR member.
43 sec.gov/comments/s7-40-10/s74010-82.pdf (last accessed on 28/03/2011).
44  http://www.ipisresearch.be/mapping.php?&lang=en (last accessed on 29/03/2011).
45 IPIS interviews with MONUSCO sta# in Kinshasa and Brussels in May and July 2010.
46 IPIS interviews with mining o$cials in Kinshasa in July and October 2010.
47  https://hiu.state.gov/Products/DRC_MineralsArmedGroups_(June_2010).pdf (last accessed on 02/03/2011).
48 The map was drawn following Section 1252 of the National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2010, Public Law 111-84 
(NDAA), enacted on 28 October  2009, stating that “the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, 
should work with other member states of the United Nations and local and international nongovernmental organizations 
to produce a map of mineral-rich zones and areas under the control of armed groups in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo.”
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While it is unclear why the process has been stalled, e#orts are now underway to set up a 
system of regular map updates produced by CaMi under the guidance of international experts 
and based on data gathering by both local mining o$cials and civil society. The mapping 
exercise could be integrated with other due diligence initiatives such as the OECD Guidance 
or the di#erent certi"cation and traceability e#orts. 
The issue of con!ict minerals at EU level
After the US Senate passed the Dodd/Frank Act, pressure on the EU to address this issue has been 
mounting. In October 2010 the European Parliament (EP) welcomed the new US ‘Con!ict Minerals’ Law 
in its Resolution regarding “failures in protection of human rights and justice in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo”.49 Despite several requests by Parliament to the European Commission (EC) and the Council 
to examine a legislative initiative along these lines, the Commission has so far limited itself to vague 
statements without concrete action.
Preliminary information came from Andris Piebalgs, the Commissioner for Development, in his responses 
to the Parliamentary questions provided from MEPs Judith Sargentini50, Marc Tarabella51 and Niki Tzavela52. 
Also Trade Commissioner Karel De Gucht touched upon the issue in his speech to the joint African, 
Caribbean, Paci"c (ACP)-EU Parliamentary Assembly on 4 December 2010.53 De Gucht acknowledged 
that the EU is one of the world’s largest importers of raw materials and should take the responsibilities 
that come with this position. He further explained that the EC is considering the issue of transparency in 
the extractive industries within a wider context of EU-"nancial regulatory reform and that it would also 
be addressed in the EC’s communication on the Raw Materials Initiative (RMI).
When the EC released its communication on the RMI, which sets out targeted measures to secure and 
improve access to raw materials for the EU, the issue of con!ict minerals was indeed mentioned.54 Yet, it 
should be noted that the RMI communication is not the best forum to address obligations for companies. 
First of all, the document is not legislative but sets out an economic strategy of the EU. Secondly, even 
though the RMI aims at  “fair” and “sustainable” supply of raw materials, it primarily has the objective 
to secure access to the market, while measures that aim at avoiding or preventing con!ict related to 
minerals can indirectly pose barriers on the trade of raw materials. 
The EC thus acknowledged – without specifying any country or situation - that revenues from resource 
extraction can fuel con!icts, yet it did not come up with innovative solutions for this problem. Besides 
expressing its support for the work of the OECD concerning the drafting of due diligence guidelines 
and other existing initiatives, the Commission did not express the intention to introduce due diligence 
requirements for companies similar to those in Section 1502 of the Dodd/Frank Act.   
The EC did propose to promote more disclosure of "nancial information and transparency for the 
extractive industry. In this respect, the creation of common EU rules on the disclosure of "nancial 
information on a country- by-country basis is currently being considered. Rules on "nancial reporting 
by multinational companies can contribute to transparency in the extractive industries, however they 
di#er from due diligence reporting on measures taken to identify the mines of origin of certain minerals 
49 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2010-0350+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN (last 
accessed on 22/03/2011).
50 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+WQ+E-2010-9040+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN (last 
accessed on 11/04/2011).
51 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?language=MT&reference=E-2010-7868&secondRef=0&type=WQ (last 
accessed on 22/03/2011).
52 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+WQ+E-2010-5532+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN (last accessed on 
22/03/2011).
53 Speech Karel De Gucht, Kinshasa, 4 December 2010. See: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/cfm/doclib_results.cfm?key=ACP-
EU&opt=1&dis=20&lan=all&ty=Speeches%20and%20articles&sta=1&en=20&page=1&year1=&year2=&sector=all&country
=all&langId=en (last accessed on 22/03/2011).
54 http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/raw-materials/index_en.htm (last accessed on 15/02/2011).
14
and to avoid that these minerals "nance armed actors. In the context of current debate on minerals 
from EDRC, it is important not to confuse these two types of corporate disclosure. Financial reporting 
mechanisms could combat corruption in the industrial mining sector, as mining companies would be 
obliged to publish what they pay to governments in countries where they are active. Trying to avoid 
"nancing rebels groups or human rights violators who are present in EDRC, where all mining is artisanal, 
is more complex. Since the region has no industrial mining operations, it will be necessary to demand 
e#orts from companies further down in the supply-chain to identify whether the minerals they are 
buying bene"t armed actors. 
In order to address the problems in the DRC mining sector, a combination of both "nancial and 
due diligence reporting will thus be required. The US legislators understood this and included both 
requirements in the Dodd/Frank Act. While Section 1502 requires due diligence reporting on the e#orts 
undertaken to, among other things, identify the mine of origin of minerals that are used in the production 
process, Section 1504 – also known as the Cardin-Lugar provision - requires extractive companies to 
include their payments on a country-by-country and a project-by-project basis, and to publish that 
information. When discussing replication of the Dodd/Frank Act at the EU level, it is thus important 
to specify whether one aims at replicating Section 1502 or Section 1504. It is possible that the EC will 
address both the "nancial and the due diligence reporting in one set of rules. Nevertheless, the public 
consultation to gather stakeholders’ views on rules on "nancial reporting by companies, conducted by 
Internal Market Commissioner Michel Barnier, only contained questions related to "nancial reporting.55 
In addition, recent comments made by Klaus Rudischhauser, a senior o$cial of the EC for Development, 
at the EITI conference in Paris (March 2011) regarding the plans for a so-called Dodd/Frank Plus Act, only 
dealt with Section 1504 type requirements.56
From the point of view of the EP, it aims at a replication of the due diligence requirements speci"ed 
in Section 1502 of the Dodd/Frank Act. On 15 December 2010, the EP repeated this concern in the 
resolution adopted regarding the future of the EU-Africa strategic partnership following the third EU-
Africa Summit. Using stronger wording than two months before, the EP states that “the adoption of 
the new US ‘Con!ict Minerals’ law is a huge step forward in combating illegal exploitation of minerals in 
Africa, which fuel civil wars and con!icts; and [that it] is of the view that the Commission and the Council 
should come out with similar proposals to ensure traceability of imported minerals in the EU.”57
 The confusion caused by the announcements at the EITI conference in March seems to be addressed 
in the draft report on the RMI of MEP Reinhard Bütikofer. This document, which will be the basis for the 
discussion regarding the Parliamentary resolution on the RMI, again speci"es that “the Parliament calls on 
the Commission to follow the US Dodd-Frank bill concerning con!ict minerals.”58 The Parliament explains 
that “the European Union should follow the US lead on the Dodd-Frank bill and require companies to 
disclose whether they source their resources from con!ict regions and require extractive industries to 
disclose their payments to foreign governments in order to enhance transparency and ensure good 
governance.”
As the EC has not taken the initiative to create a new directive or regulation that addresses the issue 
of con!ict minerals, the most feasible and e$cient way to tackle the issue of reporting obligations 
for companies active in the extractive industries, is possibly to frame it in the context of the broader 
European Corporate Social Responsibility Policies of the EU. Moreover, addressing this speci"c problem 
in a broader perspective has the advantage of leaving open possibilities to include other situations in 
which EU companies have a direct e#ect on the occurrence of human rights violations.    
55 The consultation on "nancial reporting on a country-by-country Basis by Multinational Companies closed on 9 January 
2011. More information can be found at:http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/2010/"nancial-reporting_
en.htm (last accessed on 23/03/2011). 
56 http://www.euractiv.com/en/specialreport-rawmaterials/eu-table-oil-mining-transparency-bill-news-502755 (last accessed 
on 28/03/2011).
57 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-2010-0482&language=EN&ring=P7-
RC-2010-0693 (last accessed on 28/03/2011).
58 See: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/organes/itre/itre_20110331_0900.htm (last accessed on 
23/03/2011).
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The CSR Policy of the European Union
Ten years ago, the EC presented its Green Paper “promoting a European Framework for Corporate Social 
Responsibility”59, which was followed by the EC’s Communications concerning CSR of 2002 and 2006.60 
A new CSR Communication of the Commission is planned to come out in the fall of 2011. Furthermore, 
the EC hosts and facilitates a Multi-stakeholder Forum on CSR. This Multi-stakeholder Forum, which was 
created in 2002, provides a space for dialogue about developments in CSR and the European policy 
towards it.61
In the past few years, the Multi-stakeholder Forum has addressed the issue of business and human rights 
in a constructive way. At the request of the Forum, the EC commissioned the University of Edinburgh 
with a study to “clarify the current legal framework for human rights and the environment applicable 
to EU-based companies when they operate outside of the European Union”. This report, which is often 
referred to as “the Edinburgh study” was published in October 2010 and will give guidance to the EU 
when de"ning their CSR policy and when implementing the United Nations business and human rights 
framework (also known as “the Ruggie framework”).62
Regarding the issue of disclosure of environmental, social and governance (ESG) information, the EC 
hosted a series of workshops between September 2009 and February 2010 where stakeholders had the 
opportunity to share their views on the importance of ESG disclosure, and put forward proposals for 
European policy in this "eld.63 
Following up on these workshops, the EU’s Directorate General Internal Market & Services launched 
two consultations regarding the reporting requirements. In the "rst consultation regarding “Country-
by-Country Reporting by Multinational Companies”, NGOs such as Publish What You Pay, Global Witness 
and Oxfam International advocated for mandatory country-by-country reporting requirements, referring 
to Section 1504 of the Dodd/Frank Act. In the second consultation regarding the disclosure of non-
"nancial information by companies, NGOs are demanding a general obligation for companies to report 
on any risk of violations of international human rights and environmental standards that may occur or 
that have occurred as a result of their operations, or as a result of the operations of their subsidiaries or 
suppliers. They also demand that companies have an obligation to report on any steps taken to mitigate 
such risks and violations.64 Without explicitly referring to it, this demand is similar to Section 1502 of the 
Dodd/Frank Act, yet not limited to the extractive industries.     
Even though it is not mentioned as an o$cial purpose of the consultation, the Reporting Directives will 
be revised in the summer of 2011.65 Currently, the directives allow member states to permit or require 
companies to include information relating to environmental and social matters in their annual report 
“where appropriate”. Nevertheless, as there is no guidance as to when it is “appropriate”, member states 
have translated this directive very di#erently, which has led to a reporting framework that is confusing 
for investors, the general public and for the companies themselves.66 
59 Com (2001) 366 "nal of 18/07/2001. See: http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sustainable-business/documents/
corporate-social-responsibility/index_en.htm#h2-3 (last accessed on 04/03/2011).
60 Com (2002)347 "nal of 02/077/2002 and Com(2006)136 "nal. See: http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sustainable-
business/documents/corporate-social-responsibility/index_en.htm#h2-3 (last accessed on 04/03/2011).
61 http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sustainable-business/corporate-social-responsibility/multi-stakeholder-forum/
index_en.htm (last accessed on 04/03/2011).
62 http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sustainable-business/corporate-social-responsibility/human-rights/index_en.htm 
(last accessed on 04/03/2011).
63 http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sustainable-business/corporate-social-responsibility/reporting-disclosure/index_
en.htm (last accessed on 04/03/2011).
64 European Coalition for Corporate Justice. Submission to the European Commission public consultation on disclosure of 
non-"nancial information by companies. Will soon be available at: http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/2010/
non-"nancial_reporting_en.htm (last accessed on 23/03/2011). 
65 Interview IPIS with the Commission, DG Internal Market, Financial Reporting Unit. The Reporting Directives are the Fourth 
Council Directive 78/660/EEC, the Seventh Council Directive 83/349/EEC as amended by Directive 2003/51/EC, also known 
as the Accounts Modernisation Directive. These amended Directives are available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/
accounting/legal_framework/index_en.htm (last accessed on 23/03/2011).
66 GREGOR F., Principles and Pathways: Legal Opportunities to Improve Europe’s Corporate Accountability Framework, European 
Coalition for Corporate Justice, November 2010, p. 11. 
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Interestingly, one of the recommendations of the Edinburgh Study is that “the EU and the EU Member 
States could further specify existing reporting requirements on environmental and social impacts, and clarify 
when and under what conditions human rights risks and impacts should be disclosed, including human rights 
and environmental impacts of third-country subsidiaries and suppliers of European corporations.” Not only 
does the possibility of fuelling con!ict through the trade in minerals from EDRC seem to be a "rst-class 
example of where human rights risks and impacts will need to be disclosed, but as well, the fact that 
Commissioner Piebalgs referred to the necessity to wait for the recommendations of this study when 
answering the Parliamentary question of MEP Tarabella, shows the importance of the given advice and 
that the Commission should take it into consideration.67 
Besides the incorporation of these disclosure requirements in the revision of the Reporting Directives, 
there is also an option to include them in the revision of the Transparency Directive.68 This directive, 
which aims to improve investor protection and market e$ciency by prescribing rules for securities 
traded on EU Regulated Markets and the issuers of such securities, is the direct equivalent of the Dodd/
Frank Act and will be revised in the autumn of 2011. 
Finally, in response to an often heard complaint about a lack of consultation with local stakeholders 
in relation to Section 1502 of the Dodd/Frank Act, MEP Judith Sargentini is planning a hearing session 
on 26 May 201169 at the EP with representatives of NGOs from EDRC, in cooperation with the Dutch 
research institute SOMO.70 This follows previous work of SOMO aimed at gathering opinions of local 
stakeholders, mainly from civil society, on mining reform in EDRC.71 It should be remembered though 
that civil society leaders can face tough consequences when criticizing governance of the EDRC mining 
sector. In a public speech in March 2011, for instance, the mayor of Goma, North Kivu reportedly warned 
local organizations who had expressed their support for a swift implementation of the Dodd/Frank Act 
that he “will ask the government to track down and sanction everyone who was behind these negative 
statements.”72
Measures by the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region 
(ICGLR)
The ICGLR was established in 2004 and is the highest-level peace process in the African Great Lakes 
Region.73 It involves eleven governments and has hosted several summits with the regional heads 
of state. At a December 2006 summit, the ICGLR adopted a stability Pact for the region, containing 
ten Protocols which entered into force in June 2008.74 The “Protocol on the "ght against the Illegal 
Exploitation of Natural Resources” provides the legal basis for “a regional certi"cation mechanism for the 
exploitation, monitoring and veri"cation of natural resources within the Great Lakes Region”. Subsequent 
meetings in Burundi (April 2010) and Nairobi (September 2010) adopted the Regional Initiative on 
Natural Resources (RINR), which was "nally signed by all heads of the ICGLR member states at a summit 
in Lusaka (December 2010).75
67  http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=E-2010-7868&language=MT (last accessed on 
28/03/2011).
68 http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/accounting/legal_framework/transparency_directive_en.htm (last accessed on 
23/03/2011).
69 Personal communication to IPIS on 31/03/2011 by the o$ce of MEP Judith Sargentini.
70 Communication by Tim Steinweg, a researcher with SOMO, which has conducted several investigations in supply-chains of 
the electronics industry for the Make IT Fair campaign.
71 See: Voices from the Inside. Local Views on Mining Reforms in Eastern Congo, Finnwatch & Swedwatch, October 2010.
72  http://www.raisehopeforcongo.org/node/919 (last accessed on 29/03/2011).
73 http://www.icglr.org/. 
74 http://www.icglr.org/IMG/pdf/Pact_on_Security_Stability_and_Development_in_the_Great_Lakes_Region_14_15_
December_2006.pdf (last accessed on 02/03/2011).
75 http://www.icglr.org/IMG/pdf/Lusaka_declaration_"nal_version_english-2.pdf (last accessed on 02/03/2011).
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The Lusaka Declaration endorses the OECD Guidance and calls for the harmonization of donor e#orts and 
existing certi"cation initiatives (iTSCI and CTC) with the overarching RINR. Also, it adopts six tools to curb 
the illegal exploitation of Natural Resources in the region, namely a regional certi"cation mechanism 
(RCM) for cassiterite, wolframite, coltan and gold; harmonization of national legislation; formalization of 
the artisanal mining sector; a regional database on mineral !ows; promotion of the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (EITI); and a whistle- blowing mechanism.76 
The foundations for the RCM, the core tool of the RINR, the database and the whistle-blowing 
mechanism have been laid by the NGO Partnership Africa Canada (PAC), a co-founder of the Kimberley 
Process Certi"cation Scheme (KPCS), in a project sponsored by the Swiss government.77 Based on their 
thorough working knowledge of the KPCS, the designers of the model were careful to avoid the many 
shortcomings of the diamond certi"cation system.78 
To secure local buy-in and to ensure the model is adapted to local realities, a series of extensive 
consultations and workshops were held throughout the region, including in the capital provinces of the 
Kivus in EDRC, and in the capitals of the DRC, Rwanda and Uganda.79 The four key elements of the model 
are: chain of custody tracking, making use of local tracking systems already in place; regional tracking 
through a publicly available database; mandatory third-party audits, funded by industry, publicly 
available and with checks and balances to guarantee impartiality; and independent investigations into 
anomalies by a Mineral Chain Auditor/Whistle-blowing Mechanism. 
The PAC consultants further point out that the certi"cation schemes which have already achieved 
some level of implementation on the ground (ITRI/iTSCI and BGR/CTC) are compatible with and can be 
integrated in the ICGLR system.80 Finally, the OECD Guidance is cited as a useful standard for the auditing 
of supply-chain due diligence by the industry actors involved.
Given the role of DRC’s eastern neighbors in the transit (legal and illicit) of EDRC minerals to the world 
market, issues of transparency and certi"cation require a regional approach and a considerable amount 
of political buy-in, for which the ICGLR is the appropriate body. On the other hand, it is obvious that the 
RINR will not be fully put in place when the Dodd/Frank Act comes into e#ect in April 2011. For example, 
the database tool conceived by PAC requires, among other things, an exercise in gathering reliable 
statistics from ICGLR members for the database on production and trade. A "rst attempt at this has 
proven very di$cult.81 Next on the agenda is a workshop in Burundi (April 2011) with representatives of 
all ICGLR member states on concrete steps to get the tracking and certi"cation system up and running.82 
December 2011 is the o$cial target date for system launch, which includes mineral tracking, certi"cate 
issuance, an operational database and audit protocols.83
With regard to other tools, such as the harmonization of legislation (a.o. tax legislation) and the 
formalization of mining, little progress has been made.84 Also on the whistle-blower mechanism and 
on an auto-"nancing system for the certi"cation scheme, more preparatory work is needed.85 Other 
plans for 2011 include further dissemination of the OECD Guidance. Finally, it should be stressed that 
the issue of the trade in EDRC gold largely escapes government control across the region and therefore 
76 www.icglr.org/IMG/pdf/THE_SIX_TOOLS_OF_THE_RINR.pdf (last accessed on 02/03/2011).
77 I. SMILLIE and S. BLORE, An ICGLR-Based Tracking and Certi"cation System for Minerals from the Great Lakes Region of Central 
Africa, March 2010. Available at: www.rodhecic.org/.../ICGLR_Mineral_Tracking_and_Certication_Scheme. Pdf (last accessed 
on 15/02/2011).
78 Examples are the lack of a permanent secretariat, lack of procedural !exibility and adaptability to political dynamics in 
implementing countries, inadequate monitoring and sanctioning, discretionary decision making based on (geo-)political 
considerations, and putting the burden of proof and compliance costs primarily on governments instead of industry.
79 I. SMILLIE and S. BLORE, Lessons from the Kimberley Process and Other Certi"cation Mechanisms and their Application to a 
Tracking and Certi"cation System for African Great Lakes Minerals to be housed at the ICGLR, June 2010, Unpublished, p. 10.
80 Ibidem, p. 15.
81 IPIS interview in February 2011 with source close to the ICGLR Secretariat.
82 Personal communication to IPIS by ICGLR consultant (05/04/2011).
83 I Ibidem
84 IPIS interview in February 2011 with source close to the ICGLR Secretariat.
85 Newsletter on the ICGLR Regional Initiative on Natural Resources, ICGLR, March 2011.
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"rst requires basic information gathering. This is also re!ected in the OECD Guidance, which contains an 
extensive supplement on the three T’s but not yet on gold.
While the project was previously only sponsored by the German Government through the GTZ (German 
Technical Cooperation), there is now additional funding from the Netherlands, Canada and Belgium.86 
Consequently, a fair amount of funding is available to continue implementation of the RINR tools. 
A major challenge, however, is that the ICGLR su#ers from a lack of awareness outside the region, for 
instance among stakeholders such as the US State Department, Global e-Sustainability Initiative (GESI)/ 
Electronics Industry Citizenship Coalition (EICC) and industrial actors in the supply-chains of the three 
T’s and gold. Consequently, there is a risk that the ICGLR scheme might not be accepted by end-users as 
a means to satisfy due diligence requirements under the Dodd/Frank Act.87
Measures by the DRC government
The mining ban
On 11 September 2010, the Congolese Ministry of Mines announced President Kabila’s decision to 
suspend all exploitation and export of minerals from the provinces of North Kivu, South Kivu and Maniema 
until further notice. The statement explained that the ban was intended to put a stop to the illegal 
exploitation of natural resources in EDRC88. In the decree establishing the ban, explicit reference was 
made to “the link between the illegal exploitation and the illicit trade of mineral resources, the proliferation 
and tra#cking of arms by Ma"a and armed groups, and the recurrent insecurity in the provinces of Maniema, 
North Kivu and South Kivu”89. 
In the weeks and months following the announcement of the Congolese Ministry of Mines, several 
observers expressed their doubts on the e#ectiveness and feasibility of the mining ban. In the opinion of 
some, it was highly unlikely that Congolese state institutions monitoring the embargo had the necessary 
capacity and willingness to prevent minerals from leaving the country illegally. There are indications 
that members of the Congolese military took advantage of the climate of uncertainty and confusion 
to set up and control illegal mining operations90. In the beginning of November 2010, for instance, the 
village of Binakwa, situated in the territory of Walikale, witnessed the arrest of six people who were 
in possession of an important stock of minerals. Commenting on the arrest, members of the Military 
Prosecutor’s O$ce con"rmed that “certain military and police authorities continue to exploit minerals in 
certain mines of Walikale in an illicit manner”91.  
The involvement of high-ranking FARDC o$cers in illicit mining activities was also discussed in the above-
mentioned report of the UN Group of Experts. According to the authors of the report, “this involvement 
has led to pervasive insubordination, competing chains of command, failure to actively pursue armed 
groups, amounting in certain cases to collusion, and neglect of civilian protection”92. In an interview with 
Colette Braeckman, a journalist of the Belgian daily Le Soir, one of the customary chiefs of the Walikale 
region stated that military o$cers were subjecting his people to a system of forced mining labour called 
“salongo”93. Finally, on 5 January 2011, Radio Okapi reported that, in the territory of Shabunda, situated 
86 IPIS interview in February 2011 with source close to the ICGLR Secretariat.
87 Personal communication to IPIS by ICGLR consultant (05/04/2011).
88 L’exploitation minière dans l’ancien Kivu suspendue jusqu’à nouvel ordre, Radio Okapi, 13 September 2010. 
89 Decree nr. 705 of 20 September 2010, quoted in: Fini les minerais de sang et "ni la guerre! Le président Joseph Kabila a décidé et 
au ministre des mines d’appliquer!, L’Avenir, 22 September 2010. 
90 HALL, A., Why US leadership is critical to reforming the mineral trade, Weblog of the Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, 29 December 2010. 
91 Walikale: exploitation illégale des minerais, la cour militaire promet des poursuites contre les militaires indexés, Radio Okapi, 4 
November 2010. 
92 S/2010/596, p. 3. 
93 La révolte des creuseurs gronde, Le Soir, 2 December 2010. 
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in the province of South Kivu, artisanal miners continued to dig for cassiterite, exporting their ores under 
the protection and control of Congolese army o$cers94.   
The limited success of the mining ban was also alleged by the organization Enough in a report published 
on 1 February 2011. According to the report “mining has not stopped and the ban has resulted in a windfall 
for the commanders of armed groups, mainly Congolese army o#cers, some of whom have hijacked trucks 
full of minerals”.95 
According to Congo researcher Sara Geenen96, the consequences of the mining ban have for the most 
part been negative, not only in terms of the security situation, but also in terms of the organization of 
the artisanal mining sector and the livelihoods of people directly or indirectly depending on the mining 
business for their survival. As far as the impact of the mining ban on the security situation is concerned, 
units of the FARDC have taken advantage of the new situation to strengthen their control over certain 
mines, while at the same time turning a blind eye on the continued presence and dominance of non-
state armed groups in other mines further into the interior. For their part, workers operating at the 
bottom level of the supply chain such as artisanal miners and mineral buyers have increasingly been 
forced to conclude uno$cial "nancial agreements with army o$cers and members of the mining police 
in order to get access to the mines. With regard to the organization of the mining sector, the various 
public services have not been able to use the period of the mining ban to ensure a better compliance 
with existing mining laws and regulations. Public servants clearly lack the necessary means, capacity, 
willingness and power to enforce the rule of law in the mining sector. 
Finally, the mining ban has had disastrous consequences for the standards of living in the Kivu region. 
Not only did artisanal miners and mineral buyers have a very hard time to keep a!oat "nancially, farmers 
supplying the mining areas with food products also saw their revenues dwindle as a result of the lower 
level of demand among the artisanal mining population. In addition to this, the mining ban indirectly 
gave rise to a declining availability of hard currency, since, until then, mineral exports had been by far 
the most important earner of exchange in this part of the DRC. 
When the mining ban was lifted on 10 March 2011, the general feeling among participants in the 
artisanal mining sector was that a lot of valuable time had been lost. During a workshop on due diligence 
organized by the OECD in Goma on 15 March 2011, many economic operators complained that Kabila’s 
measure had prevented organizations such as ITRI from making headway with the implementation of 
measures to render the mining business more transparent and less corruption-ridden97. 
STAREC
STAREC is the acronym for the Programme de Stabilisation et de Reconstruction des Zones sortant des 
con!its armés98. The program is due to be implemented in several areas in EDRC, including North and 
South Kivu, Maniema, Haut-Uele, Bas-Uele, Ituri and Tanganyika (in the northern part of the Katanga 
province). The rationale behind STAREC is that, in the opinion of the Congolese government, the security 
situation in EDRC has greatly improved as a result of a number of military campaigns against non-state 
military actors such as the CNDP, the LRA and the FDLR. Therefore, the authorities in Kinshasa esteem 
that it is both feasible and appropriate to start working on a plan to solve humanitarian problems and to 
kick-start socio-economic recovery in EDRC99. 
94 Shabunda: l’exploitation des minerais se poursuit, Radio Okapi, 5 January 2011. See also: GEENEN, S., The DRC mining ban: the 
view from Kamituga, 13 December 2010, http://texasinafrica.blogspot.com, (last accessed on 18 January 2011). 
95 http://www.enoughproject.org/publications/view-north-kivu p.8 (last accessed on 08/04/2011).
96 Sara Geenen is a Phd student with the Institute of Development Policy and Management (University of Antwerp), who 
conducted research on the mining sector in South Kivu in January-February 2011. This and the following paragraph is based 
on: S. GEENEN, “Le pari qui paralysait: la suspension des activités minières artisanales au Sud-Kivu”  in: L’Annuaire de l’Afrique des 
Grands Lacs (2010-2011), Paris: L’Harmattan (forthcoming).
97 Personal communication of IPIS with economic operators in Goma, 15 March 2011. 
98 This can be translated as “Program for the Stabilization and Reconstruction of zones coming out of armed con!ict”. 
99 CUSTERS, R.,  Het STAREC-plan van de Congolese regering: een voorlopige analyse,  IPIS, August 2009. 
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The STAREC plan has three components: a security component, a humanitarian and social component, 
and an economic component. The restoration of state authority over the timber and minerals sector 
is considered as an objective associated with the security component. The aim is to have the o$cial 
Congolese security forces (forces de l’ordre) exercise permanent supervision over mining sites exploited 
by armed groups, to deploy a number of state agencies at the provincial level100 and to set up checkpoints 
in the vicinity of airstrips and roads leading to mining areas. 
It is hard to say how much progress has been made with the STAREC program since it was "rst conceived. 
Nevertheless, a number of small STAREC-related initiatives have been announced in the Congolese press 
in the past few months. First, on 10 December 2010, it was announced that members of the Congolese 
army would have to comply with a new code of conduct. According to an article in the Congolese 
newspaper La Prosperité, 10,000 copies of the code of conduct had already been distributed in the 
context of a STAREC program called “réduction de l’ampleur des violences sexuelles”101. Second, during 
a meeting of the UNESCO World Heritage Committee in Kinshasa in January 2011, Congolese Prime 
Minister Muzito announced that, in the context of the STAREC program, the Congolese government had 
designed two projects for the rehabilitation of the national parks of Virunga and Kahuzi-Biega102. 
On 8 February 2011 Bruno Donat, the head of the Stabilization Support Unit of MONUSCO, the UN 
peacekeeping force in DRC, presented his action plan for the year 2011 to Julien Paluku, the governor of 
North Kivu. In addition he also announced that USD 30 million will be invested in the STAREC program, 
through the province of North Kivu. On 15 February 2011 a meeting took place in Goma, where the 
feasibility of di#erent projects was assessed.103 
MONUSCO and the “Centres de négoce”104
As part of STAREC, the plan was launched at the end of 2009 to set up "ve minerals trading centers 
(“Centres de négoce”) in EDRC in a pilot project jointly executed by the Congolese government and 
MONUSCO, the UN Peacekeeping Force in the DRC.105 Ideally, at these centers miners and traders would 
be able to do business without interference of armed groups. State agents could exert control and levy 
taxes, traders could make sure they received the necessary paperwork, minerals could be labeled and 
miners could pro"t from a competitive market environment to negotiate better prices for their products. 
Miners would have to be able to reach these trading posts with their products by foot. Therefore, each 
of the posts is intended to handle products that have been mined within a 25 km radius. Moreover a 
"xed transport route (by air or over land) would link the trading posts to regional hubs such as Bukavu 
or Goma.
The centers would be located in Baraka and Mugogo (South Kivu), and in Itebero, Isanga and Rubaya 
(North Kivu). MONUSCO’s task is, among other things, to rehabilitate roads towards the centers and 
provide training to police o$cers tasked with securing the sites and access roads. Implementation of 
the project has, however, been slow. In the case of Baraka, one could question the location of the center 
as it is too far removed from signi"cant mining sites. In Rubaya there is a parallel rebel administration 
(CNDP) and, in addition, DRC Senator Edouard Mwangachuchu, who owns several mining operations in 
100 These state agencies include the mining registry, the CEEC, and the anti-fraud service of the Ministry of Mines (source: 
CUSTERS, R., Het STAREC-plan van de Congolese regering: een voorlopige analyse, IPIS, August 2009. 
101 Les Forces armées de la RDC désormais mises au pas avec un vade-mecum d’un code de bonne conduite, La Prospérité, 14 
December 2010. 
102 La RDC en synergie avec l’UNESCO plaident auprès de la communauté internationale a"n de réhabiliter des sites congolais, ACP, 
18 January 2011. 
103 http://www.congomaboke.com/pro/2011/02/08/dans-le-cadre-du-programme-starec-la-province-du-nord-kivu-
debloque-trente-millions-de-dollars-americains/.
104 Unless indicated otherwise, this subchapter is based on: SPITTAELS,  S., MONUC’s/MONUSCO’s role in the Eastern DRC in 
regards to demilitarization and securing mining zones, IPIS, May 2010, unpublished paper.
105 GEENEN, S. & CUSTERS, R., “Tiraillements autour du secteur minier de l’Est de la RDC”, in: L’Afrique des Grands Lacs, Annuaire 
2009-2010, p. 249.
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the vicinity, is said not to support the project.106 To date only the center of Mugogo is built. However, the 
building is far too small (only 20 square meters) and the access roads are not secured.107 
Lessons from the Kimberley Process Certi"cation Scheme (KPCS)108
Launched in 2003, the KPCS brings together diamond importing, exporting and producing countries, 
representing more than 99 % of the global diamond trade, in an international control regime. All KP 
members have enacted KPCS provisions in their respective legislations and are supposed to comply 
with the prohibition of trading diamonds with non-member countries. The KPCS certi"es that diamonds 
traded under the scheme are “rebel-free”, i.e. that they are not used to "nance rebel movements. Unlike 
the OECD Guidance, the KPCS o#ers no guarantees regarding human rights violations by law enforcement 
agencies of the state. This makes the KP model inapt for EDRC, where besides non-state armed actors, a 
large number of perpetrators of human rights abuses serve in the Congolese army.
Nevertheless, eight years of KPCS implementation in the DRC provides the opportunity to draw some 
conclusions which are relevant for similar endeavors in the East.
The diamond producing areas in the DRC lie outside rebel-held territories and do not su#er from the 
high degree of militarization that characterizes the mining sector in the east of the country. What 
the diamond sector does have in common with EDRC, is that production sites are scattered over an 
immense territory where basic transport infrastructure is lacking. The geographical distribution of 
hundreds, probably thousands of diamond mines has so far rendered it impossible for the provincial 
mining administrations and SAESSCAM109 to exert adequate control and, for instance, deliver on the 
KPCS requirement of keeping reliable production statistics.110 As a result, there is no sound chain of 
custody between the mines and the buying houses at the provincial level.111 In short, certi"cation under 
the KPCS is to a high degree disconnected from production.
The buying houses are the provincial antennas of mainly foreign owned trading companies in Kinshasa. 
In this part of the supply-chain, i.e. from the provincial buying houses down to the CEEC main o$ce in 
Kinshasa, the CEEC is the main KPCS operator. The CEEC does a reasonably good job at ensuring the 
integrity of the chain of custody and keeping export statistics. This aspect of KPCS related formalization, 
can in turn have a positive impact on the state budget, as it allows export taxes on diamonds and 
exporters’ license fees to be adequately captured.112
On the other hand, the KPCS has not succeeded in formalizing diamond production, which is entirely 
artisanal and employs up to one million diggers. Mining communities are hardly aware of KPCS 
requirements such as the (costly) registration of miners and they have no incentives to subject their 
activities to state control. Artisanal diamond miners therefore operate in a situation of de facto illegality. 
This is further accentuated by the fact that the DRC Mining Code only allows artisanal mining in specially 
designated zones, a legal provision which only exists on paper and which should be administered by the 
Mining Registry (Cadastre Minier). 
106 IPIS interview in August 2010 with local mining expert in North Kivu.
107 IPIS interview on 16/03/2011 with Sara Geenen, a Phd student with the Institute of Development Policy and Management 
(University of Antwerp), who conducted research in South Kivu in January-February 2011.
108 The author of this paper has been an Observer of the KPCS, a member of the KP Working Group on Statistics from 2007 to 
2011 and partook in the KPCS review mission to the DRC in 2009.
109 SAESSCAM is the Congolese state agency tasked with the formalization of the artisanal mining sector. In addition to being 
inadequately sta#ed and funded, it has a reputation for preying on local producers. 
110 Such statistics are crucial as their comparison with import/export statistics are a tool to monitor illicit diamond !ows 
entering or leaving the country.
111 Consequently, foreign diamonds with features similar to Congolese diamonds, i.e. from neighboring countries like Angola 
or the Central African Republic, can be easily added to local parcels (or vice versa).
112 It should be noted, however, that there are no studies allowing to assess if this compensates for the costs that come with 
KPCS implementation. While the KPCS is intended to satisfy consumer demand for “con!ict-free” diamonds, these costs are 
almost entirely carried by member governments. Consequently, tax payers largely fund the diamond industry’s main tool 
to preserve a clean image for their product. The PAC consultants to the ICGLR rightfully address this anomaly by requiring in 
their certi"cation model that the costs should be primarily carried by industry.
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The KPCS is probably to some extent e#ective as a con!ict prevention tool, as it creates a disincentive to 
potentially armed non-state actors seeking rents from diamonds. The KPCS is an impediment for such 
diamonds on their way to the world market. However, eight years of KPCS implementation show that 
certifying minerals as “con!ict-free” does not yield developmental bene"ts for local mining communities 
nor does it appease tensions at the grassroots level. Conditions on diamond mining sites are dangerous 
and they are often places with considerable levels of violence. The activities of miners are controlled 
by local elites, which reinvest little or nothing in local communities. Capital formation occurs further 
downstream in Kinshasa and abroad. Furthermore, miners have nothing to gain from increased state 
control when it comes in the form of, at times repressive, underpaid state agents preying on their 
production. The same applies to revenues from minerals accruing to the state which, in the case of 
diamonds, are clearly not used to enhance livelihoods of ever more marginalized mining communities.
With the exception of the CEEC, performance of state agencies responsible for KPCS internal controls has 
been weak. This is partly because of the large number of production sites in areas with little accessibility, 
a pattern also characterizing the mining sector in EDRC, which additionally su#ers from varying levels of 
severe insecurity. The other reason is that the state agencies concerned have a serious lack of capacity. It 
is actually these very same agencies which are supposed to oversee certi"cation of EDCR minerals and 
facilitate due diligence by industry. As they are already largely overstretched in the rest of the country 
(mainly in the diamond and copper/cobalt sectors), considerable (long-term) funding and capacity 
building will be required. 
World Bank and the EDRC mining sector
In July 2010 the World Bank approved a USD 50 million project aimed at improving governance in the 
DRC minerals sector, enhancing investment conditions and increasing socio-economic bene"ts from 
mining, with a particular focus on EDRC and Katanga.113 The British Department For International 
Development (DFID) supplemented the budget with a grant of USD 40 million. Both funders and the 
DRC government baptized the project “Promines” and commissioned  a preparatory study from the US 
NGO PACT.114 However, implementation of the project has since been stalled due to a dispute between 
the World Bank and DRC authorities concerning Canadian miner First Quantum, which in 2009 lost 
its exploitation rights on a mine in Kolwezi, Katanga and in which the Bank had a stake through the 
International Finance Corporation (7.5 %).115 
Bundesanstalt für Geowissenschaften und Rohsto!e (BGR)/Certi"ed 
Trading Chains (CTC)
The engagement of the German Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources (BGR) in the 
issue of minerals certi"cation in the DRC and Rwanda, "ts into a wider framework of policies related 
to supply security of natural resources for the industry of the world’s fourth largest economy.116 Faced 
with growing global demand and a tightening supply of oil and metals, German industry groups, in 
close cooperation with government, in 2005 established a Task Force to study how to ensure a steady 
supply of raw materials.117 Being a member of the Task Force and gearing up towards the G8 Summit in 
113 http://web.worldbank.org/external/projects/main?pagePK=64283627&piPK=73230&theSitePK=40941&menuPK=228424&
Projectid=P106982 (last accessed on 01/04/2011)
114 Étude PROMINES. Exploitation minière artisanale en République Démocratique du Congo, Pact, June 2010.
115 http://uk.reuters.com/article/2010/09/15/uk-"rstquantum-enrc-idUKTRE68E27S20100915?pageNumber=1 (last accessed 
on 23/03/2011); IPIS interviews with mining experts and o$cials in DRC.
116 See, for instance: “Berlin to Secure Mineral Resources”, in Africa Mining Intelligence n° 237, 11/03/2010.
117 Africa’s Resources in a Global Context, IPIS, August 2009, p. 54-55. See: http://www.ipisresearch.be/download.php?id=270 
(last accessed on 08/03/2011); For a concise account of German business interests in the DRC coltan sector: Who’s in Charge? 
Putting the Mineral Trade in Eastern DRC under International Control: an Overview, Pole Institute, Aug. 2010, p.13 and further. 
See: www.pole-institute.org/documents/pole-mines-En%5B1%5D.pdf (last accessed on 08/03/2011).
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Heiligendamm under the presidency of Germany (June 2007), BGR conceived a method for certifying 
artisanally mined minerals118, which the Summit subsequently endorsed.119 
This system was named CTC and was "rst piloted in Rwanda, in partnership with the Rwanda Geology and 
Mines Authority (OGMR), where implementation started in 2008.120 Through a process of international 
and local consultations, BGR developed a set of certi"cation standards on traceability, transparency and 
social and environmental aspects.121 The project involves four local tin, tantalum and tungsten mining 
and processing companies and a series of third party audits was announced for autumn 2010.122 BGR 
further announced a March 2011 meeting on the project in Kigali (Rwanda), jointly organized with the 
OGMR and, importantly, the ICGLR.123
The CTC project has produced extensive literature on its broad outline and standards and over the last 
years BGR was well represented in the international circuit of conferences and workshops on good 
governance and artisanal mining. However, there are no reports providing details on the on-the-ground 
implementation of the project. The lack of publicly available statistics, audit reports or other data 
stretching beyond the conceptual level of the project, renders an evaluation of outcomes and challenges 
based on open sources impossible. 
The same goes for the extension of BGR’s endeavors to EDRC, which started in April 2009 and aims 
at introducing a certi"cation system for cassiterite, coltan, wolframite and gold.124 In this project 
BGR collaborates with the Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ, the German Technical 
Cooperation; recently renamed GIZ) and the DRC Ministry of Mines. After workshops in Kinshasa and 
Bukavu (February/March 2010) with local and international stakeholders, several gold and cassiterite/
coltan mining sites in South Kivu were selected to pilot implementation of the project and a BGR o$ce 
was set up in Bukavu. According to the BGR website, four of these mining sites (Mukungwe, Misisi, 
Lulingu, Nyabibwe) were exempt from the mining ban (see above).125 Again, workshop reports or data 
on implementation at these sites are not publicly available. While the DRC project will run until April 
2012, timelines regarding implementation set forth by BGR do not stretch further than the "rst quarter 
of 2011, when baseline audits of pilot sites are scheduled.126
The BGR initiative not only professes alignment with the RINR of the ICGLR, it also participates in the 
EU led Task Force on Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources in the Great Lakes Region, partook in the 
OECD working group establishing the Guidance and lastly cooperates with ITRI in certi"cation e#orts at 
the Nyabibwe mine.127
118 Described in: “Zerti"zierte Handelsketten im Bereich mineralischer Rohsto$e”. Projektstudie, BGR, April 2007. www.bgr.bund.
de/...rohsto#e/...Zerti"zierte__Handelsketten.../Studie_Zerti"zierte_Handelsketten.pdf (last accessed on 10/03/2011)
119 http://www.bgr.bund.de/cln_160/nn_1756078/EN/Themen/Min__rohsto#e/CTC/Approach/Political-Background/political-
background__node__en.html?__nnn=true (last accessed on 08/03/2011).
120 In parallel with CTC, BGR developed a method to track the precise origin of coltan samples (Analytical Fingerprinting). This 
method, however, is very expensive and hard to put into operation in the Great Lakes Region.
121  www.bgr.bund.de/nn_326194/.../CTC.../CTC-update-Mai2010.pdf (last accessed on 10/03/2011).
122  www.bgr.bund.de/cln_151/.../CTC/.../newsletter_09_2010.pdf (last accessed on 10/03/2011).
123  http://www.bgr.bund.de/cln_160/nn_1755398/EN/Themen/Min__rohsto#e/CTC/NewsEvents/newsevents__node__
en.html?__nnn=true (last accessed on 10/03/2011).
124 http://www.geopotenzial-nordsee.de/cln_153/nn_1755398/DE/Themen/TZ/TechnZusammenarbeit/Laender/kongo__
dr.html (last accessed on 08/03/2011); The project runs until April 2012 and has a budget of EUR 3.2 million: http://
www.bgr.bund.de/cln_160/nn_1756078/DE/Themen/TZ/TechnZusammenarbeit/Projekte/Laufend/Afrika/kongo__
rohsto#zerti"zierung.html. (last accessed on 10/03/2011))
125  http://www.bgr.bund.de/nn_1755432/EN/Themen/Min__rohsto#e/CTC/FAQ/FAQ__node__en.html?__nnn=true (last 
accessed on 10/03/2011); The statement is most likely incorrect. http://www.bgr.bund.de/cln_160/nn_1755398/EN/
Themen/Min__rohsto#e/CTC/NewsEvents/newsevents__node__en.html?__nnn=true (last accessed on 10/03/2011).
126  www.gecoproject.org/pdf/colloque/Atelier_1/QRAC_A1_12_Franken.pdf (last accessed on 10/03/2011).




The International Tin Research Institute (ITRI)/ITRI Tin Supply-chain 
Initiative (iTSCI)
ITRI is a UK based industry association boasting membership which in 2010 accounted for 67 % of global 
re"ned tin production.128 According to ITRI the DRC in 2007 yielded 4 % of global tin mine production129, 
an estimate which was left unexplained but has been frequently cited since. In its membership, ITRI 
includes actors operating across the supply-chain (smelters/processors, miners, traders, users), some 
of whom were mentioned in the December 2008 UN GoE report as buyers of cassiterite, coltan and 
wolframite from EDRC exporters (“comptoirs”) sourcing in areas controlled by rebels.130 Under increasing 
pressure from the UN and international NGOs probing into importers of DRC minerals131, and after the 
proposal of a bill in the US Congress on con!ict minerals132, ITRI responded by articulating a policy on 
artisanal and small scale mining133 and set out to design a system for improved due diligence134.
This system was named the ITRI Tin Supply-chain Initiative (iTSCI) and implementation started in July 
2009 with the collection of licenses and o$cial documents from comptoirs and traders (Phase I, self-
funded by ITRI members).135 Phase II piloted a traceability system, including a certi"cate of origin, 
enabling the veri"cation of the precise origin (mine) of minerals in EDRC. For the implementation of 
Phase II, ITRI raised a budget of USD 600,000 from smelter members and their suppliers136 and from 
downstream users involved in the GESI/EICC (further discussed in the following section).137
Work on the ground, involving tagging bags with minerals and introducing a data recording system, 
commenced in the summer of 2010 at the Kalimbi mine in Nyabibwe, South Kivu in cooperation with 
US NGO PACT, Congolese mining consultancy BEGEM and DRC state agencies. However, the project was 
halted due to the mining ban imposed by President Kabila (September 2010).138 Also Bisie, the main 
cassiterite mine in North Kivu, was selected for the pilot scheme but due to the embargo, work at that 
mine never passed the preparatory stage.139 The iTSCI was severely criticized by Global Witness, who 
alleged the scheme did not su$ciently address the problem of illegal taxation by warring parties nor the 
issue of the regular army (FARDC) which was illegally bene"tting from the trade.140⁄141 
128  http://www.itri.co.uk/POOLED/ARTICLES/BF_TECHART/VIEW.ASP?Q=BF_TECHART_285697 (last accessed on 22/03/2011).
129  www.itri.co.uk/.../ITRI%20DRC%20information%20sheet%20v1.pdf (last accessed on 15/03/2011).
130 S/2008/773 p. 19 and further. 
131 These supply-chain investigations were published in the following reports: Culprits or Scapegoats? Revisiting the Role of 
Belgian Mineral Traders in Eastern DRC, IPIS, May 2009; Faced with a gun, what can you do?’ War and the Militarisation of Mining 
in Eastern DRC,  Global Witness, July 2009.
132 The Con!ict Coltan and Cassiterite Act which was introduced in US Congress in May 2008 by Senators Sam Brownback and 
Richard Durbin. See: http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s110-3058 (last accessed on 22/03/2011).
133 ITRI Artisanal and Small Scale Mining Policy, October 2008. See: www.itri.co.uk/SITE/.../ITRI_ASM_policy_doc_v1.pdf (last 
accessed on 22/903/2011).
134 Towards a Responsible Cassiterite Supply-chain. Improved Due Diligence and Steps Towards Voluntary Industry Declarations or 
Audited Certi"cation,  ITRI, February 2009. See: www.itri.co.uk/site/upload/.../ITRI%20action%20plan%202009%20"nal2.pdf 
(last accessed on 22/03/2011).
135 DRC Artisanal and Small Scale Cassiterite Mining,  ITRI/ITSCI, October 2009. See: www.itri.co.uk/SITE/.../iTSCi_Final_
Version_2_English__2.10.09.pdf (last accessed on 22/03/2011).
136 Six of these project funders were alleged in the 2008 or 2009 UN GoE reports to have bought minerals from rebel groups. 
Two of them – Belgian trader Traxys and Thaisarco, a Thai smelter owned by British metal group AMC – in 2009 announced 
they would suspend sourcing of minerals from EDRC.
137 http://www.itri.co.uk/pooled/articles/BF_NEWSART/view.asp?Q=BF_NEWSART_318425 (last accessed on 22/03/2011).
138 iTSCi News Bulletin 6, August 2010. 
139 iTSCi News Bulletin 7, September 2010.
140 The Hill Belongs to Them.’ The Need for International Action on Congo’s Con!ict Mineral Trade,  Global Witness, December 2010, 
p. 23-25.
141 The latter concern relates to the selection of Bisie as a pilot site, as it is widely reported that the mine is heavily militarized. 
See: S/2010/596, p. 15 and further; Also the mine of Nyabibwe holds considerable con!ict potential, which is not addressed 
by a mere certi"cate of origin. The mine is the subject of a land dispute between several cooperatives, one of whom is 
headed by a local strongman with alleged ties to armed groups. Local rivalry between two cooperatives led to a violent 
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Meanwhile, ITRI has issued several statements on the negative consequences of the mining ban with 
regard to the continuation of iTSCI in the DRC. ITRI claims that funding of iTSCI relied mostly on a 
comptoir-smelter levy on cassiterite exports, which became illegal due to the ban.142 While operations in 
EDRC have stopped, ITRI launched a call for funding to restart its program in the Kivus and extend it to 
northern Katanga. The budget needed amounts to USD 31 million over a "ve-year period.143 However, as 
part of its lobbying e#orts towards current rulemaking by the SEC, ITRI claims that the Dodd/Frank Act 
will cause end-users to require that smelters stop sourcing minerals from Central Africa, which in turn 
will cease funding for iTSCI.144
ITRI has secured buy-in from the Congolese government145 and successfully liaised with the other due 
diligence initiatives. ITRI professes adherence to the OECD Guidance146, the iTSCI is mentioned in the 
Lusaka Declaration147 and gained support from GESI/EICC148 and BGR149. As an organization intended 
to serve corporate interests, ITRI has always taken a defensive stance against the UNGoE reports150 and 
upcoming con!ict minerals legislation in the US151. Now the Dodd/Frank Act has become reality, ITRI 
strives to in!uence the SEC primarily in order to obtain a transitional period of at least three years before 
the law will be fully e#ective.152 
Global e-Sustainability Initiative (GESI)/ Electronics Industry 
Citizenship Coalition (EICC)
The Global e-Sustainability Initiative (GESI) was established in 2001 to further sustainable development 
in the ICT sector. It is a membership organization bringing together leading ICT companies, industry 
associations and NGOs.153 Members include high-pro"le companies manufacturing products which are 
sensitive to NGO campaigns targeting consumers154, such as mobile phones (Motorola, Nokia, Ericsson) 
and PC hardware (Microsoft, HP). Responding to such campaigns, and to increasing pressure from US 
legislators and the UN, GESI set up an Extractives Workgroup in 2008 in cooperation with the Electronics 
Industry Citizenship Coalition (EICC). The EICC was founded in 2004 and is an ICT membership organization 
aiming at enhancing corporate social responsibility (CSR) policies in the global electronic supply-chain 
through use of a code of conduct. Its membership consists of 45 global electronics companies such as 
electronics manufacturers, software "rms, ICT "rms and manufacturing service providers.155
Joint collaboration of GESI and EICC on CSR in supply-chains started in 2008 by commissioning a study 
on metals supply to the electronic industry from GreenhouseGasMeasurement (GHGm), a Canadian 
consultancy.156 In this scoping study on global supply patterns of several metals (not tungsten or 
clash in July 2010 leaving one person dead and 17 wounded. See: Case study on Nyabibwe in The Complexity of Resource 
Governance in a Context of State Fragility: the Case of Eastern DRC,  International Alert/IPIS, publication forthcoming.
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tantalum), the authors estimated that the electronic industry used up to 36 % of global tin supply and 
9 % of gold.157 
In September 2009 GESI/EICC organized the "rst in a series of workshops with representatives of the 
tantalum supply-chain.158 By the end of the year, the same stakeholders decided to develop a smelter 
certi"cation program, involving the piloting of a purchasing process to be initiated in the DRC, which 
should ensure that smelters source from socially and environmentally responsible mines.159 Subsequently, 
another report was commissioned, this time from the US NGO Resolve, who was tasked to trace tin and 
tantalum (and cobalt) as far up as possible into their supply-chains.160 
In the supply-chains of tin and tantalum, smelters represent choke-points with twelve tin smelters 
accounting for close to the entire global production of re"ned tin161, and 80 % of re"ned tantalum 
being smelted or processed by only seven companies.162 Resolve therefore recommended, among other 
things, that end-users should use their leverage on smelters to jointly design a “con!ict-free” veri"cation 
mechanism. To design and implement this “con!ict-free” smelter program (CFS), GESI/EICC took on board 
tin supply chain actors (a.o. ITRI) and organized a workshop with representatives from the DRC Mines 
Ministry, the UNGoE, the World Bank, BGR and several NGOs.163 The CFS was launched in December 
2010 after completion of a "rst tantalum smelter assessment.164 The assessment was carried out by an 
independent third party tasked to check whether the raw materials procured by the smelter did not 
originate from sources contaminated by con!ict from DRC. The audit should help companies satisfy 
reporting requirements under Section 1502 of the Dodd/Frank Act. Further, GESI/EICC announced 
ensuing assessments of tantalum, tin, tungsten and gold smelters in 2011.
Many observers fear that end-users in the electronics and other industries will urge smelters to stop 
sourcing from Central Africa. Since GESI/EICC has not made public the assessment standards and 
results, it is hard to evaluate to what extent such fears are reasonable. It is, however, a possibility that 
under the CFS “con!ict-free” will simply be equated with “DRC (and neighboring countries)-free”. In a 
recent statement, ITRI claimed that Malaysia Smelting Cooperation is the only ITRI producing member 
who wishes to continue sourcing from Central Africa.165 Elsewhere, John Kanyoni, the President of the 
comptoirs association of North Kivu, expressed his commitment to the ongoing due diligence and 
certi"cation programs but also announced that DRC exporters would soon start prospecting for Asian 
buyers.166 However, there is currently insu$cient knowledge to predict whether newly structured supply-
chains can keep con!ict minerals outside the remit of US legislation. 
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Conclusion
In this paper we have reviewed the main current initiatives aiming at mining reform in EDRC. We 
described the basic elements of these initiatives, their genesis, the current state of a#airs, the linkages 
between the initiatives and the main challenges they face. By way of conclusion, we will brie!y discuss 
and evaluate the initiatives while focussing on the steps ahead.
The OECD Guidance is based on the on-the-ground investigative experience of the UNGoE and aligns 
with the Group’s due diligence recommendations, which were endorsed by the UNSC in Resolution 
1952 (November 2010). The Guidance adequately re!ects the typology of ways in which armed actors – 
rebels and FARDC – pro"t from the minerals trade. This allows for nuanced, site-speci"c assessments by 
companies and auditors of armed group involvement in production and trade of minerals, which ranges 
from gross human rights violations to (illegal) payments for protection to the FARDC. 
The adoption and implementation of the OECD Guidance by companies across the supply-chains of 
the three T’s and gold is key in responding to the self-evident need for harmonization of current EDRC 
mining reform initiatives. An important step in this process was the formal adoption of the Guidance by 
all North Kivu comptoirs at a recent workshop in Goma. For the sake of methodological uniformity and 
e#ectiveness, this example should now be followed by other companies across the supply-chain, from 
comptoirs in other DRC provinces down to end-users. Industry associations such as ITRI and GESI/EICC 
have publicly expressed their support for the Guidance and should urge their members to adopt and 
implement it, among others by enshrining the Guidance in contracts with their suppliers. UN member 
countries should, in line with Resolution 1952, encourage companies under their jurisdiction to do the 
same, as should the ICGLR, which has endorsed the Guidance in the Lusaka Declaration (December 
2010). A huge step forward would be if the SEC rules that the Guidance is the due diligence standard 
for all companies a#ected by the Dodd/Frank Act. Finally, legislators at EU level should promptly 
start consulting with the OECD to inform their e#orts. Meanwhile, the OECD should continue to raise 
awareness, assist companies with the implementation of the Guidance and come forward with the 
supplementary guidance on gold.
The underlying assumption of current EDRC mining reform and due diligence initiatives is that these will 
contribute to the demilitarization of the EDRC mining sector. This assumption will, in the "rst instance, 
be put to the test as soon as the Dodd/Frank Act becomes e#ective, probably on 15 April 2011, and 
subsequently as the other initiatives, i.e. on certi"cation (ICGLR, ITRI, BGR), are gradually implemented. 
Security impacts will be site-speci"c and will need to be closely monitored at the grassroots level. Case 
studies on speci"c localities in recent reports by national (i.e. Pole Institute) and international NGOs 
(i.e. Global Witness, IPIS/International Alert), together with the latest UNGoE reports serve as a baseline 
measurement of the current security situation at mining sites. The picture, however, is fragmented and 
a more systematic and long-term approach is needed. 
The UNGoE is a key stakeholder for comprehensive on-the-ground assessments of human security 
impacts of the initiatives under review. In addition, the Group should in its upcoming reports  (May and 
October 2011) pay particular attention to compliance by companies across the supply-chains of the 
three T’s and gold with the due diligence recommendations outlined in the Group’s November 2010 
report. These investigations should cover possible new supply-chains structured to avoid companies 
a#ected by the Dodd/Frank Act and include companies involved in the trade of the three T’s and gold 
which claim not to source or use minerals from Central Africa. 
The SEC should shortly adopt the rules which will serve as guidance to Section 1502 of the Dodd/
Frank Act. Despite the numerous requests for lengthy transitional periods by corporate stakeholders, 
due diligence obligations for companies using the three T’s and gold in their products should become 
e#ective without further delay. Companies can conduct due diligence immediately, while EDRC mining 
reform initiatives are gradually implemented. It should be remembered that most of these initiatives 
were started in response to legislative e#orts that began in the US in 2008 and that, most probably, a 
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lengthy phase-in period will slow down implementation. Secondly, the SEC should not allow companies 
sourcing con!ict minerals outside Central Africa, for instance tantalum from Australia or Canada, to use 
the label “DRC con!ict-free”. The rationale behind Section 1502 is to ensure that minerals from DRC and 
adjoining countries are con!ict-free and bene"t the local population, not to promote supply-chains 
of minerals from non-DRC countries to the detriment of the latter. Finally, as pointed out above, the 
SEC would greatly contribute to the e#ectiveness of due diligence by a#ected companies if the OECD 
Guidance were adopted as part of a standard methodology for drafting and auditing con!ict minerals 
reports.
US legislation will have far-reaching security and economic impacts on the local population in EDRC 
and the wider region. Possibly, the EDRC economy will shortly su#er from a slowdown caused by less 
mineral exports at lower prices. The US and other donors should ensure long-term follow up on possible 
negative impacts, both in terms of security and of local livelihoods, and address these by, among others, 
increasing support to security sector reform and economic development. One vehicle for this should be 
the strategy which the State Department and USAID are required to elaborate under Section 150 and 
which is currently two months overdue. This strategy, which according to the law should aim at breaking 
the linkages between minerals and con!ict in EDRC, should include programs to increase the capacity 
of DRC state agencies which are supposed to facilitate due diligence and execute mining reform. In 
addition, the State Department should promptly publish the con!ict minerals map, which is another 
requirement under Section 1502. This map should comprehensively cover EDRC mining sites and provide 
detailed, site-speci"c information on security issues, ideally guided by the UNGoE’s typology of ways in 
which armed groups bene"t from minerals. The purpose of the map, which should be regularly updated, 
is to inform companies and auditors across the supply-chains of EDRC minerals and to supplement on-
the-ground follow-up by the UNGoE on security impacts of mining reform.
At the level of the EU, there is considerable confusion with regard to policies and legislative initiatives on 
EDRC con!ict minerals. So far the EC has, in the framework of the Raw Materials Initiative, not displayed 
an unambiguous intention to introduce due diligence requirements similar to those in Section 1502 of 
the Dodd/Frank Act. This would obviously be necessary to close loopholes and create a level playing 
"eld for companies a#ected by the US law, including European companies trading on US Exchanges. 
Germany is the driving force behind the RMI and is, through BGR and GIZ, the EU country most directly 
implicated in current EDRC and regional mining reform. Therefore, Germany should assume a leading 
role in assuring EU countries that increased transparency and corporate accountability, including legal 
due diligence obligations, can contribute to supply-chain security, which is the rationale behind the 
RMI. 
It should, however, be noted that the RMI is a framework for policies, not for legislation. Concerning the 
latter, this paper identi"ed two windows of opportunity to shortly introduce due diligence obligations 
similar to Section 1502 in EU law. First there is an upcoming revision of the Reporting Directives (summer 
of 2011), which are part of the CSR policy framework of the EC and which regulate, among other things, 
reporting requirements of companies and their suppliers on human rights risks and impacts. Secondly, 
there is the revision in the autumn of 2011 of the Transparency Directive, which prescribes rules for 
issuers of securities traded on EU regulated markets. For its part, the EP in a December 2010 Resolution 
called the US con!ict minerals law a huge step forward in combating illegal exploitation of minerals in 
Africa and urged the EC and the Council to come out with similar proposals. On 26 May 2011 MEPs will 
organize a hearing with DRC stakeholders on the matter, responding to claims that in the case of the 
Dodd/Frank Act, local actors have not su$ciently been consulted.
Besides adoption and implementation of the OECD Guidance, integration of the iTSCI, BGR and CFS 
in the RINR is the second cornerstone of harmonization of the ongoing initiatives. The trade in EDRC 
minerals is a regional problem and the ICGLR, which is the highest-level peace process in the region, is 
the appropriate body to deal with it and hence should overarch the other initiatives. Nevertheless, the 
current RINR e#orts su#er from a lack of awareness outside the region, for instance among stakeholders 
such as the US State Department, GESI/EICC and industrial actors across the supply-chains of the three 
T’s and gold. Consequently, there is a risk that the ICGLR scheme might not be accepted by end-users as 
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a means to satisfy due diligence requirements under the Dodd/Frank Act. Therefore, it is of the utmost 
importance that the ICGLR increases its e#orts at awareness raising outside the region.
The ICGLR has completed most of the conceptual work surrounding a regional certi"cation scheme and 
is in the initial stage of implementation of the main RINR tools (RCM, database). The task is huge as this 
involves, for instance, the collection of reliable mineral production and trade statistics from all eleven 
ICGLR members to feed into the database. Still, the ICGLR plans to o$cially launch the RCM (tracking, 
certi"cate issuance, audit standards) and database in December 2011. While this work is being carried 
out, the implementation of other tools is currently stalled. As is the case with the KPCS, the tools of the 
RINR will have to be integrated into national law. So far, however, not much headway has been made 
with regard to harmonization of national legislations, including the issue of taxes. Equally, work on the 
formalization of artisanal mining and the promotion of EITI has not progressed much, although the 
latter could in principle be applied to the more formalized companies involved in the regional mineral 
trade. Finally, the ICGLR should devote much attention to trade and production of gold, as the gold 
trade in the region to date largely escapes government control. Adequate funding for accelerated RINR 
implementation seems to be in place, as the ICGLR has succeeded in expanding its array of donors. 
The mining ban decreed by President Kabila (September 2010 – March 2011) showed that an overall 
embargo on mining has negative consequences in terms of security and for the livelihoods of the local 
population. The DRC government and state agencies displayed a lack of capacity to adequately monitor 
the embargo and enforce the rule of law. Consequently, the FARDC tightened their grip on the mining 
sector and turned a blind eye on the continued presence and dominance of non-state armed groups in 
other mines further into the interior. 
The mining ban also had negative consequences for the standards of living in the Kivu region. Not only 
did artisanal miners and mineral buyers have a very hard time to keep a!oat "nancially, farmers supplying 
the mining areas with food products also saw their revenues dwindle as a result of lower demand among 
the artisanal mining population. In addition to this, the mining ban indirectly gave rise to a declining 
availability of hard currency. Until then, mineral exports had been by far the most important earner 
of exchange in this part of the DRC. When the mining ban was lifted on 10 March 2011, the general 
feeling among participants in the artisanal mining sector was that a lot of valuable time had been lost. 
Economic operators claim that Kabila’s measure had prevented organizations such as ITRI from making 
headway with the implementation of measures to render the mining business more transparent and less 
corruption-ridden. Finally, there seems to be a lack of follow-up of the DRC government’s STAREC plan, 
which was announced in 2009 and aims, among other things, at strengthening government control 
over the EDRC mining sector. While the plan on paper looks promising, the implementation record is 
sketchy while communication on progress is limited to anecdotal coverage by the Congolese press.
The “Centres de négoce” pilot project of MONUSCO is often quoted but its possible impact should 
not be overestimated. It involves only "ve trading centers catering to mining sites within a radius of 
approximately 25 km. One of these will be too far located from signi"cant mining sites, another one 
faces opposition from a DRC Senator with mining operations in the vicinity. Two years after the project 
was announced, only one center – in Mugogo, South Kivu – has been built, but the infrastructure and 
security provisions reportedly are inadequate. This said, MONUSCO should continue the project, improve 
!aws and publicly report on further implementation.
Eight years of KPCS implementation in the DRC allow the initiatives under review to draw a number of 
important lessons. The ICGLR is adequately taking care to avoid conceptual, procedural and operational 
!aws of the KPCS in the design and implementation of the RINR. At a more concrete level, three important 
conclusions regarding the KPCS track record in the DRC are highly relevant for EDRC mining reform. First, 
most DRC state agencies, with exception of the CEEC, have performed weakly with regard to internal 
KPCS controls. As they are already overstretched in the diamond and copper/cobalt sector, long-term 
funding and capacity building will be required to adequately implement mining sector reform in EDRC. 
Second, artisanal miners should be o#ered incentives to enter into a process of formalization. They should 
be empowered to be able to obtain better prices for their products and to assist in the monitoring of 
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certi"cation schemes. Third, grievances in mining communities, for instance over mining rights, arise in 
a context of poverty and local power relationships, which often funnel capital to a small number of elites 
who do not reinvest in the communities. Such grievances lie at the basis of insecurity in the region and 
they should be addressed by increased socio-economic bene"ts from mining at the grassroots level. The 
KPCS in the DRC clearly shows that increased government control and tax revenues are by no means a 
guarantee for fair redistribution mechanisms to the bene"t of mining communities, while widespread 
patterns of wealth accumulating to the bene"t of the happy few are a permanent threat to peace and 
security. The DRC government, donors and stakeholders engaged in the implementation of certi"cation 
schemes should envisage ways to address this issue.
Two major stakeholders with the ability to address the previously discussed issues are the World Bank 
and DFID, who in July 2010 jointly approved a USD 90 million project aimed at, among others, enhancing 
governance in the mineral sector and increasing socio-economic bene"ts from mining, with a particular 
focus on Katanga and EDRC. Implementation, however, has stalled over a dispute regarding an industrial 
miner in Katanga which has lost its exploitation rights. This should not be to the detriment of reform 
initiatives in EDRC, which urgently need accompanying measures with regard to, among other things, 
capacity building and mining community development.
BGR/GIZ and ITRI to date are the only initiatives to have achieved some level of on-the-ground 
implementation in EDRC, which was put on hold because of the mining ban between September 
2010 and 10 March 2011. Work involved tagging and bagging of minerals after a preparatory phase of 
verifying licenses and o$cial documents from traders and comptoirs. The sites selected, however, were 
not subjected to a preliminary and publicly accessible assessment of armed group involvement. This 
raised the important issue of who should decide on the eligibility of mining sites where certi"cation is 
implemented. Discretionary power rests primarily with the DRC government, but this should be based 
on a sound security assessment for which the OECD Guidance constitutes a proper standard.
Further, BGR seems to have achieved considerable success with the implementation of the CTC in Rwanda 
but this has not yielded open source documents which could contribute to transparency regarding 
imports of EDRC minerals or the supply-chain further downstream. Neither have concrete plans of BGR 
and GIZ with regard to further implementation of CTC in EDRC been announced. Finally, continuation of 
the iTSCI in Rwanda and the DRC depends on funding by industry, which is currently uncertain.
GESI/EICC announced it has completed the assessment of one tantalum smelter under the CFS and 
that more smelter (the three T’s and gold) assessments will follow this year. Smelters of the three T’s 
constitute choke-points in the supply-chains, with twelve tin smelters accounting for close to the entire 
global production of re"ned tin and 80 % of re"ned tantalum being smelted or processed by only seven 
companies. Therefore, there is a danger that end-users will require smelters to stop sourcing minerals 
from Central Africa altogether, instead of constructively engaging in e#orts to create con!ict-free supply-
chains from DRC and adjoining countries. With the adoption date of SEC rules nearing, speculations, 
mostly pessimistic, abound on the economic and security impact such scenario could have in EDRC and 
the region.
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